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INTRODUCTION
Weber (1946) distinguished three basic dimensions of stratification: 
status or prestige, power or the ability to carry out one's will irres­
pective of the resistance of others, and class or economic position. It 
was not until the nineteen forties that one of the more interesting 
implications of this perspective was systematically considered. Benoit- 
Smullyan in a brief section of a paper (1944) advanced the idea that 
there is a tendency for individuals to equilibrate or equalize their 
ranks on the dimensions of stratification identified by Weber. In 
this paper we shall attempt to do two things. First,we shall attempt 
to advance our understanding of the relations that may obtain among 
these dimensions of stratification in both simple and complex social 
systems. By a simple system we mean a part of a complex system.
Definitions of both types of systems will be given later. Second, we 
shall attempt to show how efforts by the members of a simple system 
to increase the ranks of their system at the complex system level may 
affect its internal stratification.* It will be helpful for us to 
adopt at this point a standard set of labels. We shall follow Weber 
in using the term status to refer to prestige. We also shall employ 
the term power in the sense that he did. Finally, we shall use the 
term economic rewards to refer to roughly what he meant by class.
STRUCTURES OF SOCIAL SYSTEMS
Before considering the dimensions of stratification and the ways 
in which they may be related, it is necessary to define certain structures
of social systems. Any social system is viewed as having a cultural
2and a behavioral structure. The cultural structure is viewed as consisting
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of goals and norms. A goal is defined as a desired state of affairs.
A norm is defined as an expectation for behavior.
The behavioral structure is viewed as consisting of all of the 
behavior which is relevant to the norms of the system. Behavior is 
viewed as divisible into segments, each of which is relevant to a 
single norm. It is considered possible for any segment of behavior 
to vary with respect to the degree to which it is in conformity with 
the norm to which it is relevant.
The cultural and behavioral structures considered as a single, 
more complex unit are viewed as divisible into two additional types 
of structure. One of these shall be referred to as the task structure.
3The other shall be referred to as the non-task structure. The task 
structure is viewed as consisting of task norms and the behavior 
relevant to them. By a task norm is meant a norm which defines either 
productive behavior or behavior related to the control or coordination
4of productive behavior.
The concept of non-task structure is, as the prefix non suggests, 
a residual concept. In general, we view this structure as consisting 
of all of the norms and the behavior relevant to them which are not 
included in the task structure. Little has been done toward conceptual­
izing this structure in a non-residual way. We shall identify two types 
of non-task norms here. One shall be called an equality norm. The 
other shall be called a representational norm. An equality norm is 
viewed as a norm which defines behavior which every member of a system
5owes to every other member of that system. Norms defining courtesy 
of various kinds are examples of equality norms.
A representational norm is viewed as a norm which defines behavior 
which every member of a system is expected to display toward every 
member of one or more other systems.^ Norms defining secrecy 
concerning various kinds of activities within one's own system are 
examples of representational norms.
An important difference between task and non-task norms should be 
noted here. If task activities are divided in a system--and we assume 
that they always are, at least to some degree— then, task norms will 
not apply to all members of the system. Certain members will have 
responsibility for certain activities, and certain other members will 
have responsibility for certain other activities. Conversely, non-task 
norms— at least those we are considering— do apply to all members of 
the system.
None of the concepts presented thus far specifically relates the 
structures we have considered to the individual. We use the concept of 
position to do this. A position is viewed as a set of norms which 
includes both task and non-task norms and which applies to an individual 
or class of individuals.
In a later section we shall modify this general conceptualization 
of the structures of social systems so as to distinguish between 
simple and complex social systems.
DIMENSIONS OF STRATIFICATION
We may now turn to a consideration of the dimensions of stratification. 
Let us consider status first. The structures described in the previous 
section lead clearly to a conception of status as a set of different
־3־
kinds of evaluations. We stress the term kinds to prevent confusion 
between differences in members' evaluations of a single base of status 
and differences in members' evaluations of different bases of status.
The former differences represent variation in evaluation which results 
from a low degree of consensus on the criteria of evaluation and/or 
incomplete knowledge concerning the Individual being evaluated.^ The 
latter differences represent variation in evaluation which results from 
the existence of different bases of status. In this section we shall 
assume both a relatively high degree of consensus on criteria of evaluation 
and relatively complete knowledge concerning the individual being 
evaluated and shall focus on variation resulting from the existence
g
of different bases of status.
The different kinds of evaluations making up an individual's status
shall be referred to as specific statuses. All of the specific statuses
making up an individual's status shall be referred to as general status.
Evaluation of the task norms included in an individual's position is
viewed as one kind of specific status. The term task status is used to
refer to this specific status. The criterion employed in evaluating task
norms is considered to be the difficulty of the activities to which the
norms refer. Evaluators are considered to arrive at some conception
9of the average difficulty of these activities.
Evaluation of the degree to which an individual conforms to the 
task norms included in his position is viewed as another kind of 
specific status. The term performance status shall be used to refer 
to this specific status.^
If we assume that an individual's performance is evaluated, it 
seems reasonable to assume that skills and motivations which are 
deemed relevant to his performance will also be evaluated. Such evalua­
tions are viewed as additional kinds of specific statuses. Evaluation 
of skills relevant to performance shall be referred to as skill status. 
Evaluation of motivations relevant to performance shall be referred to 
as motivational status.
Task, performance, skill, and motivational statuses are based on 
the individual's location and participation in the task structure of a 
system. Evaluations of the individual's conformity to the equality 
and representational norms included in his position are specific 
statuses which are based on his participation in the non-task structure. 
Evaluation of conformity to equality norms shall be referred to as 
solidarity status. The term solidarity is used because it is believed
that the receipt of behaviors which indicate various kinds of equality
12is a major source of attraction of individuals to a system. An
individual's solidarity status is thus an assessment of one aspect of
his contribution to the attraction of the other members to the system.
Evaluation of conformity to representational norms shall be referred
to as loyalty status. The term loyalty is used because it is believed
that what is generally meant by disloyalty to the members of a system
13is the violation of such norms.
Let us turn next to a consideration of power. The power of a
member of a system derives, we think, from the dependence of the other
14members of the system on him for the attainment of the system goal.
Such dependence stems, we think, from division of task activities 
which are essential to the attainment of the system goal among the
־5-
members of the system. Once such activities are divided, members 
have equal potential power. This is true, of course, because any 
member can prevent attainment of the goal by not performing his 
activities. Given this, how do we explain the fact that the a ctual 
power of the members of a system is seldom, if ever, equal? The 
explanation appears to be that members are differentially replaceable.
If a member threatens not to perform his activities, the other members 
of the system should attempt to replace him. Thus, the actual power of 
a member depends on how easy it is to replace him. In general, the 
ease with which a member can be replaced should tend to be aligned 
with the difficulty of his task location and the skill and motivation 
which adequate performance of the activities it involves requires.
Finally, let us consider economic rewards. An economic reward
is viewed as any object which is either potentially or actually useful
to the individual in a material s e n s e . A n  important difference
between economic rewards and status and power is that economic rewards
are completely transferable whereas status and power are not.^ Status,
as we have indicated, is based in part on the attributes of skill and
motivation. Certainly these are at best only partially transferable
from one individual to another through learning. Power as we have
indicated, is based on replaceability which, in turn, like status,
is dependent in part on skill and motivation. Thus, power also is
18only partially transferable from one individual to another.
RELATIONSHIPS AMONG DIMENSIONS OF STRATIFICATION
Having considered the dimensions of stratification in some detail, 
we may now attempt to specify the relations among them. As we noted
earlier, Benoit-Smullyan held that individuals tend to equilibrate or 
equalize their ranks on the different dimensions of stratification 
(1944, pp. 158-161), According to Benoit-Smullyan this may occur in 
ways he called indirect or direct. By indirect he meant the use of one 
rank to change another. For example, he discussed such things as 
converting economic rewards into power by purchasing positions of command 
or means of coercion. By direct he meant the tendency to perceive ranks 
on the different dimensions of stratification as equal irrespective 
of whether or not they are in fact,(1944, pp. 159-160)
The type of equilibration which Benoit-Smullyan referred to as 
indirect was described by him at a fairly concrete level. In this 
paper we shall attempt to define more abstract processes which may 
underlie the specific conversion processes he described. The type of 
equilibration in question would appear to occur when the nembers of a 
system can assign ranks on the different dimtasions of stratification 
with a reasonably high degree of certainty. This is possible in the 
case of both status and power only when there is a relatively high 
degree of consensus on criteria of evaluation and relatively complete 
knowledge of the bases of status. We include power here because, as 
we have attempted to show, it is based on certain of the factors that 
status is based on. In the case of economic rewards, we assume that a 
relatively high degree of consensus concerning what constitutes such 
rewards and relatively complete knowledge concerning their possession 
is essential to assignment of ranks with a relatively high degree of 
certainty.
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When there is such consensus and knowledge, power should be 
aligned with the height of the segment of the individual's general status 
which is based on his location and participation in the task structure. 
For purposes of simplicity, we shall henceforth refer to this segment 
as the segment of general status associated with task structure. By 
the height of any segment of the individual's general status we mean 
an average of different kinds of evaluations. The segment of general 
status which is associated with task structure consists, it will be 
remembered, of evaluations of task, performance, skill, and motivation. 
Thus, the height of this segment of general status will be the average 
of these evaluations. Power should be aligned with the height of this 
segment of general status because the evaluations of which the segment 
consists refer to factors which affect the ease with which the individual 
can be replaced. For example, an individual who has a highly evaluated 
task location, but who does not have the skill and the motivation to 
perform adequately the activities it involves is probably more easily 
replaced than an individual who has the same kind of task location but 
who does have the skill and motivation to perform adequately the 
activities it involves.
When there is a relatively high degree of consensus on criteria
of evaluation of the bases of status and power and on what constitutes
economic rewards and relatively complete knowledge of the bases of
stratification, economic rewards also should be aligned with the
height of the segment of the individual's general status \diich is
19associated with task structure. We think this will be so because 
the height of this segment of general status probably serves as a basis
for allocating economic rewards. The. specific process involved is,
we think, an equity process similar to Homans' distributive justice
20(1961, Chapter 12). For example, both the height of the segment 
of general status associated with task structure and the amount of 
economic rewards received should be lower for an individual who has a 
highly evaluated task location but who does not have the skill and 
motivation to perform adequately the activities it involves than they 
should be for an individual who has the same kind of task location 
but who does have the skill and motivation to perform adequately (and 
who presumably does so perform) the activities it involv«s.
We may summarize the preceding ideas as follows. When ranks on
the different dimensions of stratification can be assigned with a
relatively high degree of certainty, the individual's power and
economic rewards will tend to be aligned with the height of the segment
of his general status which is associated with task structure. The
height of this segment of general status, in turn, depends upon the
21heights of the specific statuses of which it consists.
Let us turn next to a consideration of the type of equilibration 
which Benoit-Smullyan referred to as direct. This type of equilibration 
would appear to occur only when the members of a system cannot assign 
ranks on the dimensions of stratification with a relatively high degree 
of certainty. Not being able to assign ranks with a high degree of 
certainty probably results from a low degree of consensus on criteria 
of evaluation of the bases of status and power or on what constitutes 
economic rewards or from an incomplete knowledge of the bases of 
stratification or both. Under such conditions, we think a process
occurs in which the members of the system use the rank which can be
assigned with the greatest degree of certainty to assess the other
22ranks. For example, it may sometimes be easier to assign an 
individual a rank on the dimension of economic rewards than it is to 
assign him a rank on the dimensions of general status and power. In 
such an instance, rank on economic rewards, if the process operates 
as we think it does, would be used to assess ranks on general status 
and power.
When there is a shift from conditions under which it is, possible 
to assign ranks with a relatively high degree of certainty to conditions 
under which it is, not possible to do so, we do not think that only 
that segment of the individual's general status which is associated 
with task structure is related to power and economic rewards. Rather, 
we think that under these conditions ranks on any and all bases 
of status, including ranks on bases associated with non-task structure, 
will be used to assess other ranks. This will be true, of course, 
only if the status dimension is the dimension on which ranks can be 
assigned with the greatest certainty. Further, we think that ranks on 
bases of status associated with non-task structure may be used even 
to assess ranks on bases of status which are associated with task 
structure. This should happen, of course, only if ranks on bases of 
status associated with non-task structure can be assigned with greater 
certainty than ranks on any other bases, including bases associated 
with task structure.
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SIMPLE AND COMPLEX SOCIAL SYSTEMS
Thus far we have not considered in any detail the distinction 
between simple and complex social systems. Our treatment of the structures 
of systems and the dimensions of stratification has focused on the 
position as the unit of analysis. As we view systems, this unit of 
analysis is the basic element of simple systems. We define a simple 
system as a set of positions, the task structures of which are related 
to a single goal. For example, the research activities of a group of 
professors would constitute a simple system if they were directed 
toward completion of a single study. Note that this definition of a 
simple system does not confuse the system with individuals. The 
research activities of a single group of professors would constitute 
two simple systems if they were directed toward completion of two 
studies.
Having defined a simple social system, we may now define a complex 
one. Just as we view the position as the basic element of the simple 
system, we view the simple system as the basic element of the complex 
system. We define a complex system as a set of simple systems the goals 
of which are related to a single superordinate goal. For example, two 
studies being carried out by a single group of professors would 
constitute a complex system if they were related to an overall project 
goal. Note that the definition of complex system, like the definition 
of simple system, does not confuse the system with individuals. Two 
teaching and two research activities of a single group of professors 
would constitute two complex systems if they were related respectively 
to two teaching and two research goals which, in turn, were related
- 11-
respectively to a superordinate teaching goal and a superordinate 
research goal.
STRATIFICATION OF SIMPLE AND COMPLEX SYSTEMS
Our treatment of the dimensions of stratification has been relevant 
only to the simple system level, that is, it has dealt only with 
stratification of positions. In what ways can be modify our con­
ceptualizations of the dimensions of stratification so as to make them 
relevant to the complex system level, that is, so as to make them 
relevant to the stratification of simple systems? Let us consider the 
dimension of status first. The step from the simple system level to 
the complex system level involves, we think, a reduction in knowledge. 
Specifically, it seems likely that at the complex system level only 
factors directly related to the task structure of a simple system, 
namely, task locations, performances, skills, and motivations of 
members will be known. The reason for this would appear to be that 
the task structure of a simple system is of basic importance to 
other simple systems within the same complex system because the 
goals of the simple systems making up a complex system are interdependent.
The non-task norms of a simple system and, hence, its members' conformity 
־־ at least directly-־ 
to them are not/a part of such interdependence and, thus, are not likely
to be known. For these reasons the general status of a simple system
shall be viewed as some average of the evaluations vAiich are made of
the task locations, performances, skills, and motivations of its members.
Let us consider power at the complex system level next. The task 
structure of a simple system and the skills and motivations relevant
- 12-
to adequate performances of the activities it involves should relate
to the replaceability and thus the power of the members of a simple
system within a complex system in the same way that the task location
and the skill and motivation relevant to adequate performance of the
activities it involves relate to the replaceability and thus the
power of the individual within a simple system. For this reason the
power of the members of a simple system shall be viewed as dependent
23upon some average of the replaceabilities of its members.
Finally, let us consider the dimension of economic rewards at 
the complex system level. Such rewards should be allocated among the 
simple systems within a complex system on the same basis that they are 
allocated among individuals in a simple system, namely, the height of
2  A
status. For this reason a simple system's rank on the dimension of 
economic rewards shall be viewed as some average of the economic rewards 
of its members.
RELATIONSHIPS AMONG DIMENSIONS OF STRATIFICATION 
IN COMPLEX SOCIAL SYSTEMS
One important difference between the simple system level and the 
complex system level is that collective action on the part of the 
members of a simple system is possible. The collective action which 
seems most important for present purposes is action which would affect 
the replaceability of the members of the simple system. Any action 
which would make it more difficult to replace the members of the 
simple system should increase their power.
How can the members of a simple system make it more difficult to 
replace them? They can do this, we think, by threatening to withdraw 
en masse if any one of their members is removed. The threats often made 
by labor unions to strike if any one of their members is fired are 
examples of this kind of threat. The threat of mass withdrawal increases 
power because at any one point in time, loss of the membership of a 
simple system usually has much greater effect on attainment of the goal 
of the complex system than does loss of a single member of a simple 
system. The reason why this is so is that if the members of a simple 
system are replaced one at a time, it is usually possible to carry on, 
although perhaps in a somewhat less productive way, the task activities 
of the simple system by having certain of its members carry out, in 
addition to their own task activities, the task activities of a removed 
member pending his replacement.
Vie have considered how the members of a simple system through 
collective action can make it more difficult to replace them. We 
must now consider when and why they can be expected to do this. As 
to when, we think that the potential for increasing power that exists 
at the complex system level is actualized when simple systems cannot 
be assigned ranks on the dimensions of stratification with a high degree 
of certainty. As we noted earlier, inability to assign ranks with a 
high degree of certainty probably derives from a low degree of consensus 
on criteria of evaluation of the bases of status and power or on
- 14-
what constitutes economic rewards or from incomplete knowledge of the 
bases of stratification or both.
The question of why the members of simple systems use collective 
action to prevent replacement requires consideration of generalized 
aspiration for high ranks for the simple system qua system. If we 
assume that the members of a simple system wish their system to have 
high ranks on all of the dimensions of stratification, it seems likely 
that when ranks cannot be assigned with a high degree of certainty, 
they will act collectively to prevent replacement if they perceive 
that the increase in power in which this results can be used to obtain 
higher ranks. How can the increase in power be used to obtain higher 
ranks? The general process is, we think, as follows. First, the 
members of the simple system obtain through the use of their increased 
power a higher rank on the dimension of stratification on which ranks 
can be assigned with the greatest certainty. This is accomplished by 
threatening to block attainment of the goal of the complex system.
This threat takes the form specifically, we think, of threatening to 
stop or to curtail productive activities. Second, obtaining a higher 
rank on the dimension of stratification on which ranks can be assigned 
with the greatest certainty should initiate the process described 
earlier whereby evaluators— in this case the members of other simple 
systems— assess other ranks in terms of the rank which can be assigned 
with the greatest certainty.
T h '-i above considerations rai.s« f:ha question of whether or not the 
bases of one of the dimensions of ;־.!:ratification are generally associated 
with greater consensus and/or knowledge and therefore constitute a
scale along which ranks can generally be assigned with greater certainty. 
We think not. It would seem just as easy for there to be a lack of con­
sensus about what constitutes an economic reward as it would be for 
there to be a lack of consensus about how difficult the activities 
constituting a task structure are. Similarly, it would appear to be 
just as easy to limit knowledge of economic rewards as it would to limit 
knowledge of the activities constituting a task structure.
If we are correct in assuming that the bases of any of the 
dimensions of stratification can constitute the scale along which ranks 
can be assigned with the greatest certainty, it becomes necessary to 
consider the specific ways in which the members of a simple system can 
employ the additional power which derives from collective action to 
prevent replacement to obtain higher ranks for their system on all of 
the dimensions of stratification. It is to these processes that we 
turn in the next section.
MODES OF INCREASING THE RANKS OF SIMPLE SYSTEMS 
ON THE DIMENSIONS OF STRATIFICATION
Since the bases of general status and power are the same at the
25complex system level, we must consider them jointly. When these 
bases constitute the scale along which ranks can be assigned with the 
greatest certainty and when there is generalized aspiration for high 
ranks for simple systems, members of simple systems should attempt to 
use the additional power which derives from collective action to prevent 
replacement to increase their rank on this scale. They can do this by 
threatening to stop or to curtail productive activities unless they
- 16-
are allowed to move as a group to another task structure which is 
believed, although be it with limited certainty, to consist of more 
difficult activities. This mode of increasing general status and power 
ranks we shall call system mobility. A similar mode of increasing 
general status and power ranks is what we shall call merging. This 
involves the members of a simple system combining their task structure 
with the task structure of a more highly ranked simple system. This 
would raise the general status and power ranks of the members of the 
simple system in question because evaluators would then assign the newly 
formed simple system new general status and power ranks which would be 
some average of the general status and power ranks which the two simple 
systems had prior to the merger.
System mobility and merging are likely to be very difficult to effect. 
System mobility involves displacement of the entire membership of another 
simple system, something which is not likely to be easily accomplished. 
Merging will result in the reduction of the general status and power 
ranks of the simple system which had the higher general status and power 
ranks prior to the merger, a fact which is likely to make the members 
of that simple system strongly resist it.
Given the difficulty of system mobility and merging, it seems 
likely that the members of a simple system may sometimes be forced to 
employ a mode of increasing ranks on the general status and power 
dimensions which does not involve use of the additional power which 
derives from collective action to prevent replacement and which, thus, 
rather than involving a threat to stop or to curtail productive activities 
involves just the opposite, namely, increasing productivity. This
mode of increasing ranks on the general status and power dimensions we 
shall refer to simply as increasing productivity. One might ask why 
this mode is not used before system mobility or merging is attempted.
The basic reason would appear to be that it is likely to involve a 
relatively small change in a base of general status and power, namely, 
performance. System mobility and merging, by contrast, are likely to 
involve relatively large changes in a base of general status and power, 
namely, task structure. In the case of system mobility, it is possible, 
in addition, that the members of the simple system will, in time, elevate 
their skills and performances so as to make them more adequate to the 
new task structure.
Regardless of how the members of a simple system increase their 
ranks on the general status and power dimensions, such increases should 
increase the rank the members of the system receive on the dimension of 
economic rewards. This should occur, of course, only if the bases of 
general status and power constitute the scale along which ranks can 
be assigned with the greatest certainty.
When the bases of economic rewards constitute the scale along which 
ranks can be assigned with the greatest certainty and when there is 
generalized aspiration for high ranks for simple systems, members of 
simple systems should attempt to use the power which derives from 
collective action to prevent replacement to increase their rank on 
this scale. They can do this by threatening to stop or to curtail 
productive activities unless they are given a larger proportion of the 
economic rewards accruing to the complex system. They would do this,
- 18-
of course, with the hope that their receiving an increased proportion
of economic rewards would become, at least in a limited way, known. Note
that we use the term proportion of economic rewards rather than amount.
The reason for this is that since the absolute amount of rewards
available to the complex system may vary, it is the proportion of
rewards received which determines a simple system's rank. An
increase in rank on the dimension of economic rewards should result
in increases in both general status and power ranks. This should occur,
of course, only if the bases of economic rewards constitute the scale
26along which ranks can be assigned with the greatest certainty.
EFFECTS OF THE DIFFERENT MODES OF INCREASING RANKS OF 
SIMPLE SYSTEMS ON THE STRATIFICATION OF SIMPLE SYSTEMS
We come now to the second major purpose of the paper, namely, 
a consideration of how efforts by the members of simple systems to 
increase the ranks of their system may affect its internal stratification. 
We begin by noting that the modes of increasing the ranks of a simple 
system on the dimensions of stratification appear to have two kinds of 
effects on its general status stratification. Increasing task performance 
should result in increased weight being given to those bases of individual 
status which are associated with task structure. Since the members 
of a simple system are differentiated in terms of their location in the 
task structure, any increase in the weight given to bases of status 
related to this structure should increase general status stratification 
within the system.
- 19-
How should an increase in general status stratification affect
power and economic reward stratification within the simple system?
Tho determining factor here would appear to be whether or not conditions
within the system are such that individuals can be assigned ranlcs on
the dimensions of stratification with a high degree of certainty. If
they are, the increase in general status stratification should xesult
in increases in power and economic reward stratification. This should
occur because under these conditions power and economic rewards are
aligned with the bases of status which are associated with task structure,
and it is these bases which receive greater weight in the process under
27consideration.
If conditions are not such that individuals can be assigned ranks 
with a high degree of certainty, an increase in general status strat­
ification should result in increases in power and economic reward 
stratification only if the status dimension is the dimension on which 
ranks can be assigned with the greatest certainty.
All of the other modes of increasing the ranks of a simple system-־ 
system mobility, merging, and obtaining a larger share of economic 
rewards־־should result in increased weight being given to those bases 
of individual status which are associated with non-task structure.
This effect is more complex than the one just discussed and thus 
requires more extended treatment. Why should more weight be given to 
bases of status which are associated with non-task structure when the 
members of the simple system use these modes of increasing ranks? It 
will be remembered that all of these modes involve threatening to
- 20-
negatively affect attainment of the goal of the complex system. It 
will also be remembered that this is likely to be effective only if 
the members take collective action to prevent being replaced one at a 
time?‘* Both of these factors would appear to make it necessary for the 
members of the simple system to present a united front to the members 
of other simple systems. This, in turn, would appear to make certain 
kinds of representational norms much more important. Specifically, 
norms prescribing secrecy concerning any dissention within the simple 
system relative to its threat to negatively affect attainment of the 
goal of the complex system and relative to its threat to withdraw 
en masse if any one of its members is replaced are likely to become 
very important, and more weight is likely to be given to conformity to them.
What about conformity to equality norms? Asking a member to 
expose himself to the possibility of having to withdraw from the complex 
system as part of a mass withdrawal by the members of his simple system 
would appear to require some kind of reward. We think this may take 
the form of greater equality. If this is the case, equality norms 
should become much more important and more weight should be given to 
conformity to them.
The effect of giving more weight to bases of status associated 
with non-task structure should be to decrease general status strati­
fication within the simple system. The reason this should occur is 
that non-task norms--at least as we define them— apply to all members 
of the simple system and thus must not require greater ability than that 
of the least able member of the system. In short, non-task norms define 
activities the performances of which require only high motivation. If
־21־
we assume that the members of the simple system are motivated to achieve 
high ranks for their system, it seems likely that all of them will 
conform to non-task norms. Thus, giving more weight to conformity to 
such norms makes the members of the simple system more equal with respect
to general status and decreases general status stratification within
29the system.
How should this decrease in general status stratification affect 
power and economic reward stratification within the simple system? As 
in the case of an increase in general status stratification, the deter­
mining factor would appear to be whether or not conditions are such that 
individuals can be assigned ranks on the dimensions of stratification 
with a high degree of certainty. If they are, the decrease in general 
status stratification should not affect power and economic reward 
stratification. This should be so because under these conditions power 
and economic rewards are aligned with the bases of status which are 
associated with task structure, and these bases do not receive greater 
weight in the process under consideration. If conditions are not such 
that individuals can be assigned ranks with a high degree of certainty, 
the decrease in general status stratification should result in decreases 
in power and economic reward stratification only if the status dimension 
is the dimension on which ranks can be assigned with the greatest 
certainty. This should be so because, as we noted earlier, under these 
conditions ranks on any and all bases of status, including ranks on 
bases associated with non-task structure, will be used when assessing 
other ranks.30
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SUMMARY OF CONCEPTS AND PROPOSITIONS
In this section we will review the concepts and propositions 
presented in the previous sections. Our primary aim will be to make 
clear the logical structure of these sections.
A social system was defined in terms of culture and behavior. 
Culture was viewed as consisting of goals and norms. Behavior was 
viewed as being governed by norms but as sometimes deviating from them. 
This conceptualization of the social system was elaborated by noting 
that certain norms are directly related to goal attainment. These we 
called task norms. Generally, we viewed them as having to do with 
productive behavior. We further elaborated the conceptualization of 
the social system by pointing out that there are certain other norms 
that are not directly related to goal attainment. These we called non­
task norms. Specifically, we defined two types of such norms: equality 
and representational norms. Equality norms define behavior which every 
member of a system is expected to display toward every other member of 
that system. Representational norms define behavior which every member 
of a system is expected to display toward every member of one or more 
other systems.
The various kinds of norms and behavior were viewed as being 
related to the individual by means of the concept of position. A 
position was defined as a set of norms which apply to an individual or 
a class of individuals.
Next, conceptualizations of what we consider to be the basic 
dimensions of stratification were presented. First, we defined bases
of individual status. These were task location, performance of task 
activities, skills and motivations relevant to performance of task 
activities, and conformity to the different types of non-task norms. 
Evaluation of each of these bases we viewed as a specific status. All 
of the specific statuses combined we viewed as a general status.
Second, we viewed power as deriving from the dependence generated 
by the division of task activities among the members of a system. We 
pointed out that if all activities are essential to goal-attainment, a 
division of task activities creates a condition of equal power of 
members. However, we noted that this is offset by the fact that 
different degrees of replaceability are associated with different task 
activities and that it is this fact that leads to differential power. 
Further, we noted that it is the more difficult and thus the more highly 
evaluated activities for which it is the most difficult to find 
replacements.
Finally, we defined economic rewards as any object of actual or 
potential material use. We noted that economic rewards, unlike status 
and power, are not fully transferable from one individual to another.
The reason for this is that status and power are based in part on the 
attributes of skill and motivation whereas economic rewards need not 
be so based even indirectly.
Having defined the basic dimensions of stratification, we turned 
to a consideration of ways in which these dimensions may be related.
We hypothesized that those aspects of general status which are associated 
with task structure determine the individual's power because they deter­
mine how easy it is to replace him. We hypothesized further that these
same aspects of general status determine through an equity process the 
economic rewards the individual receives. All of these relations we 
qualified by saying that they hold only when there is consensus on 
criteria of evaluation and on what constitutes economic rewards and 
complete knowledge of the bases of stratification.
When there is a lack of consensus on criteria of evaluation or on 
what constitutes economic rewards or a lack of knowledge of the bases 
of stratification or both, we suggested that relations among the 
dimensions of stratification are quite different. Under these conditions 
it should be difficult to assign an individual ranks on the dimensions 
of stratification with certainty. When this is true, we hypothesized 
that evaluators assess ranks on the dimensions of stratification in 
terms of the individual's rank on the dimension of stratification on 
which ranks can be assigned with the greatest certainty. This dimension 
can be, we suggested, any one of the three basic dimensions. We also 
suggested that under the conditions being considered, ranks on any or 
all bases of status, including ranks on bases associated with non-task 
structure, may be used to assess other ranks.
At this point, we indicated that our treatment of the relations 
among the dimensions of stratification was relevant only to the simple 
system level. We defined a simple system as a set of positions the 
task norms of which are related to a single goal. Then we defined a 
complex system as a set of simple systems the goals of which are related 
to a single superordinate goal. Having defined the two kinds of systems, 
we suggested that certain changes in the relations among the dimensions 
of stratification occur at the level of complex systems. These
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should be the case because a simple system's non-task norms and, 
hence, their members' conformity to them are probably not known by the 
members of other simple systems and, hence, are probably not a base of 
the simple system's general status. If the combined dimension of 
general status and power is the dimension on which ranks can ba assigned 
with the greatest certainty; we suggested that the members of a 
simple system could increase their ranks on it in at least three 
different ways. Only two of these involve use of the additional 
power which derives from collective action to prevent replacement.
These are system mobility and merging. System mobility involves 
movement of all of the members of a simple system from one simple 
system to another. Merging involves the members of a simple system 
combining their task structure with the task structure of a more highly 
evaluated simple system.
The way of increasing ranks on the combined dimension of general 
status and power which does not involve use of the additional power 
which derives from collective action to prevent replacement is improving 
task performance.
If the dimension of economic rewards is the dimension on which 
ranks can be assigned with the greatest certainty, we suggested that 
the members of a simple system could increase their rank on it by 
obtaining a larger proportion of the economic rewards accruing to the 
complex system. This, like system mobility and merging, involves use 
of the additional power which derives from collective action to 
prevent replacement.
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Regard less of which of the two dimensions, general status and 
power or economic rewards, is the dimension on which ranks can be 
assigned with the greatest certainty, we hypothesized that if the 
members of a simple system increase their rank on that dimension, 
they will increase their rank on the other dimension. This should 
occur because the system's rank on the dimension on which ranks can 
be assigned with the greatest certainty is used to assess its rank on 
the other dimension.
In the last part of the paper, we considered how the modes of 
increasing a simple system's ranks may affect its internal stratification. 
The modes we considered appear to affect in two ways the degree of general 
status stratification within the simple system. If the mode of increasing 
ranks is improving task performance, greater weight should be given to 
the bases of status associated with the task structure, and general 
status stratification should increase. This should occur because the 
bases to which greater weight is being given are those which differentiate 
the members of the system.
We considered at this point how this increase in general status 
stratification may affect power and economic reward stratification within 
the simple system. It should result in increases in power and economic 
reward stratification when individuals can be assigned ranks with 
certainty. This should be so because under these conditions the bases 
of status which are associated with task structure are aligned with 
power and economic rewards, and it is these bases which receive greater 
weight in the process under consideration. When individuals cannot be 
assigned ranks with certainty, the increase in general status stratification
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ranks is improving task performance, greater weight should be given to 
the bases of status associated with the task structure, and general 
status stratification should increase. This should occur because the 
bases to which greater weight is being given are those which differentiate 
the members of the system.
We considered at this point how this increase in general status 
stratification may affect power and economic reward stratification within 
the simple system. It should result in increases in power and economic 
reward stratification when individuals can be assigned ranks with 
certainty. This should be so because under these conditions the bases 
of status which are associated with task structure are aligned with 
power and economic rewards, and it is these bases which receive greater 
weight in the process under consideration. When individuals cannot be 
assigned ranks with certainty, the increase in general status stratification
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should result in increases in power and economic reward stratification 
only if status is the dimension on which ranks can be assigned with the 
greatest certainty.
If the mode of increasing ranks is system mobility, merging, or 
obtaining a larger proportion of economic rewards, greater weight 
should be given to the bases of status associated with non-task 
structure. This should occur because obtaining a larger proportion of 
economic rewards involves threatening both to stop or to curtail 
productive activities and to withdraw en masse if any member of tne 
simple system is replaced and because these threats, in turn, create 
a greater need for conformity both to representational and equality 
norms. Conformity to representational norms should become more 
important because of the need to keep secret any dissention within the 
system concerning the threats. Conformity to equality norms should 
become more important because of the need to reward members for 
exposing themselves to the possibility of having to withdraw from the 
complex system. If greater weight is given to the bases of status 
which are associated with non-task structure, general status stratification 
within the simple system should decrease. This should occur because 
non-task norms apply to all members of the system and thus have to 
be norms that can be conformed to by all members of the system.
Conformity to non-task norms should occur because of the members' 
desires to increase the ranks of the simple system.
We considered at this point how this decrease in general status 
stratification may affect power and economic reward stratification 
within the simple system. It should not result in decreases in power 
and economic reward stratification when individuals can be assigned
ranks with certainty. This should be so because under these conditions 
power and economic rewards are aligned with the bases of status which 
are associated with task structure, and these bases do not receive 
greater weight in the process under consideration. When individuals 
cannot be assigned ranks with certainty, the decrease in general status 
stratification should result in decreases in power and economic reward 
stratification if status is the dimension on which ranks can be 
assigned with the greatest certainty. This should be so because 
under these conditions ranks on any or all bases of status, including 
ranks on bases associated with non-task structure, may be used to 
assess other ranks.
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FOOTNOTES
1 This problem has been dealt with by Bales in terms of the 
tendency of stratification within groups to alternately increase and 
decrease as the group responds first to problems of goal attainment 
and then to problems of integration. (1965) We shall deal with 
essentially the same phenomena, but we shall attempt to identify new 
factors affecting the phenomena, especially factors associated with the 
stratification structures of simple and complex systems.
2 This is a widely accepted view. See, for example, Williams 
(1965, Chapter 3, especially pp. 36-37). The importance of distinguishing 
between culture and behavior is brought out clearly in some of Homans' 
work (1950, pp. 125-127, 138-144).
3 The concepts of task and non-task structure are similar to 
Homans' concepts of external and internal systems (1950, Chapters 4 
and 5).
4 For a similar conception of task structure see Dubin (19 58, 
Chapter 5).
 ^The concept of equality norm was suggested by Linton's concept 
of universals (1936, pp. 272-273).
^ The concept of representational norm is somewhat similar to 
what Blau has referred to as a basic norm. See Blau (1963, pp. 201-202).
7 In this section we use the phrases "the individual being 
evaluated" and "the individual's status." We use these phrases 
because we think that certain attributes which all individuals have in 
varying degrees and which are relevant to positions within systems 
are bases of status. The terms should not be taken as indicative of
an interest in individual attributes which are not relevant to positions.
8 In a later section we will be concerned with situations in 
which there is a low degree of consensus on criteria of evaluation 
and/or incomplete knowledge concerning the individual being evaluated 
and in which it is consequently difficult to assign rank on the 
status dimension with certainty.
9 See Davis and Moore (1945, p. 244) for a general discussion 
of difficulty as a base of status.
The concept of performance status is similar to Davis' 
concept of esteem. See Davis (1949, pp. 93-94).
H  Reference is not made to the individual's location in this 
structure because the term location is meaningless with respect to 
equality and representational norms. This is true, of course, 
because these norms— at least, as we define them־־apply to all of the 
members of a system.
We should note here that we do think there are certain additional 
kinds of representational norms which do apply to some members of a 
system and not to others. Such norms are probably related to activities 
which facilitate the carrying out of task activities. Such norms also 
probably apply only to members occupying more difficult positions.
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If this is the case these members' conformity or lack of conformity to 
them should only increase or decrease differences in status which are 
based on activities that are directly related to goal attainment.
In the interest of simplicity, we shall not consider these additional 
kinds of representational norms in this paper.
12 cf. Homans (1961, Chapter 15).
3^ cf. Blau (1963, Chapter 10).
14 This conception of power is similar to conceptions advanced 
by Thibaut and Kelley (1959, Chapter 2) and Emerson (1962, pp. 32-33).
15 These ideas were suggested by Davis and Moore's concept of 
scarcity of personnel. See (1944, p. 244). For empirical evidence 
concerning the effect of replaceability on power see Wilensky (19 56, 
Chapter 11, especially pp. 226-230).
16 d0 not intend to imply here that economic rewards have 
only material uses. Quite the contrary. In a later section we shall 
consider some important implications of the symbolic aspects of 
material rewards.
17 For a similar distinction see Parsons (1953, p. 95).
18 In addition to being transferable in part because skill and 
motivation can be learned, status and power are also transferable in 
part because task location can be ascribed and because such location 
makes, at least temporarily, some contribution to status and power, 
even if the individual does not have the skill and motivation to perform 
the activities it entails.
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1.9 It might be argued that in the case of economic rewards we 
should include all segments of general status, i.e., include conformity 
to non-task norms or what we have referred to as solidarity and loyalty 
statuses. We would like to leave this question open. At present we 
are inclined to think that economic rewards are determined primarily 
by task location. Economic rewards for conformity to non-task norms 
are given, we suspect, by ascribing task locations. This is a very 
complex process. It probably explains in part how inconsistencies among 
the specific statuses defined in this paper develop. We intend to 
discuss it further in future publications.
20 For a general discussion of equity processes gee Adams (1965).
For a theory of the equilibration of the specific statuses 
*Aiich constitute the segment of the individuals' general status which 
is associated with task structure, see Kimberly (1966; 1967).
If the propositions involved here prove to be correct, 
desires for greater power and economic rewards could be viewed as 
sources of pressure toward equilibration or disequilibration of the 
specific statuses which constitute the segment of general status which 
is associated with task structure. We say equilibration or dis­
equilibration because some specific statuses such as skill status may 
not be changeable (see Kimberly, 1966, p. 223), and whether a desire 
to raise the height of this segment of general status will lead to 
equilibration or disequilibration will depend both upon whether the 
specific statuses are presently aligned and whether one or more 
of them is unchangeable.
..22 This process was suggested by Parsons' discussion of the 
symbolic meaning of possessions (19 53, p. 105).
23 In the next section we shall consider how the necessity of 
simultaneously replacing all of the members of a simple system as 
opposed to successively replacing single members of the system affects 
its power.
24 Note that at the complex system level we do not specify 
height of the segment of general status associated with task structure 
as we did at the simple system level. The reason for this is, of 
course, that at the complex system level status consists only of 
evaluations of factors related to task structure.
25 This, it will be remembered, is because conformity to non­
task norms tends not to be known at the complex system level and 
therefore tends not to be a base of general status.
26 The development of ideas presented in this section were 
stimulated by Merton's work on anomie (19 57, Chapters 4 and 5).
^  A note concerning the specific mechanisms which are probably 
involved here is in order. As greater weight is given to the bases 
of general status which are associated with task structure, task 
locations are evaluated in an increasingly differentiated way. This 
should affect power because it should affect assessments of the ease 
with which different individuals can be replaced. A fact which we did 
not consider previously in order to simplify presentation is that while 
it is true that status evaluations reflect objective factors that
determine actual ease of replacement, such evaluations are never 
completely objective, and it is always perceived differences in task 
locations and perceived ease of replacement that determines power.
Evaluating task locations in an increasingly differentiated 
way, should also affect economic rewards because, as we just indicated, 
such evaluations are never completely objective, and it is always 
perceived differences in task locations that affect economic rewards.
O Q
The fact that all of these modes of increasing a simple 
system's ranks involve use of the power resulting from collective 
action to prevent replacement was called to the author's attention 
(which was somewhat fixated as a result of being too close to the 
problem) by Joann R. Kolmes, an undergraduate, in a final examination.
29׳,Tie effects outlined here are similar to the common obser­
vation that external threat produces internal cohesion. For reviews of 
some studies which seem to show that groups in threatening environments 
develop strong socio-enotional structures which serve to mitigate 
effects of the environments, see Marcus (1960) and Litwak (1961, p. 171).
30 See page 10, above.
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